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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Petitioners appeal the order and written opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals entered on March 10, 1989, 
unanimously reversing the earlier judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, 
Third Judicial District Judge presiding. 
Jurisdiction to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is conferred by Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling provisions of the statutes relevant to 
this case, sections 26-24-14, 26-24-15, 26-24-18, and 26-24-20, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), are set forth in Exhibit E in 
the Appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners seek to overturn the ruling of the court 
of appeals, reversing the district court's determination that 
the licensing fee standard adopted by the Salt Lake City-County 
Board of Health (hereafter the Board) is invalid. The 
appellate court did not defer to the trial court's rulings on 
the three questions of law decided by the district court but 
instead reversed them on a correction of error of standard. In 
essence, the court of appeals ruled that the public hearing in 
connection with the Board's adoption of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law was sufficient, that the Board had authority 
to impose regulatory fees, and that the licensing standard 
constitutes a fee rather than a tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Board adopted a licensing fee standard in order to 
defray some of the costs of the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department's food inspection program. The licensing fee 
standard establishes fee categories and fee amounts arranging 
from $15 to $100 per year, relative to the size and complexity 
of the restaurants and food establishments inspected by the 
Health Department. (Licensing Fee Standard attached as Exhibit 
C). 
At the time the standard was presented for public 
hearing, the actual cost of the food inspection program, 
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including personnel costs and some overhead, was estimated at 
approximately $430,000, and the licensing fee standard was 
estimated to generate $156,000. (Findings of Fact, Exhibit D). 
Fees collected pursuant to the licensing fee standard, 
as indicated in the affidavit of auditor Nelson G. Williams, 
are accounted for separately from County general funds and, 
pursuant to section 26-24-18, are reserved in a special health 
department account reserved exclusively for the food inspection 
program. (R-162-165) 
In adopting the licensing fee standard, the Board, 
pursuant to state law, published notice of the hearing on 
August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and the 
Deseret News. (R-73) A public hearing on the licensing fee 
standard was conducted on September 10, 1986, by a board-
appointed hearing officer from the Health Department. 
Approximately thirty citizens appeared at the hearing, and many 
of those in attendance submitted oral and written comments. 
(R-60) 
At the subsequent October 2, 1986 Board of Health 
meeting, the Board, having received a summary of comments from 
the September hearing, written comments from the public and 
Health Department staff, and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, accepted further oral arguments from 
private parties and Health Department staff in attendance. 
(R-66-72, 82) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board, 
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upon the motion of board member, Dr. John Bevan, voted to 
accept the Health Department's recommendations and to implement 
the licensing fee standard. (R-71-72). One member of the 
Board opposed the motion and one abstained. (R-72) The Board 
then approved and signed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
which were very similar to those previously prepared by the 
Board's hearing officer. (Exhibit C). 
Following the adoption of a licensing fee standard, 
the petitioners filed this action for declaratory judgment in 
Third District Court to determine the validity of the licensing 
fee standard. Following oral argument on motions for summary 
judgment submitted by both parties, Honorable Third District 
Court Judge Richard H. Moffatt issued a minute entry on June 
24, 1987, granting the petitioner's motion for summary judgment 
and, thereafter entered judgment in their favor on August 18, 
1987. (R-161, R-191-197) 
The court of appeals reversed the district court's 
decision on the grounds that: (1) The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law adopted by the Board did not have to be 
supported by evidence upon the record at the public hearing 
because it was a rule-making hearing, not governed by the 
limitations of an administrative adjudicative hearing, and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law could be properly based 
on information known or secured by the Board, formally or 
informally; (2) the Board had statutory authority under Utah 
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Code Ann. section 26-24-14(14) to impose fees to defray costs 
of a local health department regulatory program; and (3) the 
charges imposed under the fee standard constituted "fees" and 
not "taxes" under the standards articulated by Utah Supreme 
Court in Utah Restaurant Assoc, v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 
709 P.2d 1161 (Ut. 1985). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners request review of this case pursuant to 
Rule 43(4), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
...(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided 
an important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by this court. 
While it is undisputed that the questions decided in this case 
are important questions (for example, the Health Department 
alone receives over $1 million per year from regulatory fees, 
R-125), this case does not involve questions which have not 
been, but should be, settled by this court. This court has 
already decided the issues presented in this petition on 
numerous occasion, including a recent case involving a nearly 
identical restaurant fee structure provision adopted by the 
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Davis County Board of Health. Unfortunately, the trial court 
ignored and supplemented the procedural and substantive 
requirements of the Local Health Department Act as interpreted 
by this court, choosing instead to create a type of "user fee" 
standard for review and requiring a full-blown evidentiary 
hearing to support the adoption of regulatory fees- As 
recognized by the appellate court, the trial court's holdings 
are unsupported by statute and the clearly established common 
law precedents of this state. In light of petitioner's failure 
to demonstrate the absence of, or need for, court direction on 
the questions presented for appeal, this case is inappropriate 
for review and petitioners' writ should be denied. 
ARGUMENT FOR DENIAL OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
POINT I. 
THE BOARD HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT A 
COMPREHENSIVE FEE SCHEDULE TO REIMBURSE THE 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT FOR COSTS OF INSPECTING 
FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS. 
In the lower court proceedings, both the trial court 
and the court of appeals recognized that a local board of 
health has delegated authority pursuant to section 
26-24-14(14), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), to establish and 
collect appropriate fees. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
Exhibit A, page 8; District Court Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, Exhibit B, page 5). Both courts reached 
this conclusion based on section 26-24-14 which authorizes a 
local health department to "establish and collect appropriate 
fees...for public health purposes." The trial court, however, 
viewed section 26-24-14(14) very narrowly, ruling that this 
section 
refers only to the charging of fees for such 
minor items as preparing certificates, 
copying fees, and similar fees for specific 
services to particular persons for their 
specific benefit, such as have been 
traditionally imposed by governmental 
bodies. The statute does not authorize 
defendant to attempt to offset substantial 
portions of its total costs, including 
salaries and overhead involved in particular 
programs, through the imposition of such 
charges. fExhibit B, p. 5] 
The court of appeals rejected the trial court's 
restrictive definition, ruling that there is not "the slightest 
hint" that the legislature intended to restrict fees to minimal 
charges for clerical or administerial services. The appellate 
court pointed out that, in addition to section 26-24-14(14), 
section 26-24-15(1) of the Local Health Department Act 
expressly provides that "money available from fees...may be 
used to establish and maintain local health departments." The 
appellate court also noted that section 26-24-18 provides that 
fees for local health purposes must be expended only for 
maintenance and operation of a local health department. 
-7-
(Complete text of the above statutes is contained in the 
Appendix to this brief). The court concluded that since there 
is every indication from the statutory language that the 
legislature intended fees to be used along with other funds for 
operating and maintaining a local health department, and there 
is no indication whatsoever that fees are to be limited to the 
purposes specified by the trial court; local boards of health 
are statutorily authorized to impose charges to defray the cost 
of a regulatory program. 
In an attempt to produce a statutory basis for their 
position, petitioners compare the grant of authority given 
local boards of health to "establish and collect fees" with the 
grant given the State Department of Health to adopt fee 
schedules, "submitted to and approved by the Legislature as 
part of the department's annual appropriations request." See 
section 26-1-6, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Petitioners 
conclude that since local boards of health are not also 
required to submit their fee schedules to the legislature for 
prior approval, the Board's power to assess fees is somehow 
limited. This argument was not a basis for the trial court's 
ruling and reflects a basic misunderstanding of the budget 
process of local government agencies, County budgets operate 
independently of the state process with the County Commission 
rather than the legislature reviewing and setting budget 
standards for county agencies. (See section 26-24-4, "The 
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governing body of each county shall create and maintain a local 
health department.") Recognizing once again that the 
legislature has authorized the collection of fees to maintain 
local health departments, it is unreasonable to argue that 
local health departments are preempted or limited in their 
ability to collect fees merely because of the existence of a 
statute governing the adoption of fees by the State Health 
Department. 
The legal question of whether a local board has 
authority to adopt fees to defray the cost of a regulatory 
program is settled law and, therefore, inappropriate for review 
by a writ of certiorari under Rule 43(4), Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This court has already concluded on a number of 
occasions that counties, and, specifically, local health 
departments, have authority to establish and collect 
appropriate fees. In Utah Restaurant Assoc, v. Davis County 
Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Ut. 1985), this court, in 
reviewing a nearly identical fee regulation schedule, ruled 
that a board has authority under section 26-24-14(14), U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended), to assess appropriate fees. This court 
stated that in order for a local board of health to charge 
fees, "authority must be conferred on it by the county which 
created it, acting within its lawful authority, or by the 
legislature" id. at 1164. This court then referred to 
section 26-24-14(14) as the "pertinent provision" which gives a 
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local health department authority to establish and collect 
fees. Having concluded that the legislature had authorized fee 
collection, this court then considered whether the "fee" 
adopted in Davis County was a fee or a tax and whether the 
Board complied with procedural requirements for establishing a 
fee, the identical issues raised in this petition. 
This court in Mtn. States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Ut. 1985); Consolidated Coal 
Co. v. Emery Co., 702 P.2d 121 (Ut. 1985); and Smith v. Carbon 
County, 63 P.2d 259 (Ut. 1953), acknowledged the authority of 
counties, not just cities, to enact regulatory fees to defray 
costs of inspection and related expenses. In Mtn. States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. supra at 118, this court recognized a 
county's authority to regulate the use of public roads and to 
charge reasonable fees to defray the cost of regulation. In 
Consolidated Coal, supra at 127, this court affirmed the 
holding in Cache County v. Jensen, ruling that counties may 
raise revenue through licensing "insofar as such revenue is 
necessary to (and, therefore proportionate to the cost of) 
regulation of the licensed entities." Further, in Smith, supra 
at 263, this court recognized Carbon County's ability to charge 
fees for services in probate proceedings subject to the 
condition that "the amount of fees must be exact and must bear 
some reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the 
services rendered." 
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Petitioners did not cite one Utah case which stands 
for the position that counties, or local boards of health 
created by counties, lack authority to assess fees or that fees 
must be limited to user fees "for specific services to 
particular persons to their specific benefit." (District Court 
Findings, Exhibit B.) The only cases cited were those in which 
this court ruled that counties have no right to tax merely for 
revenue, for example Consolidated Coal and Mtn. States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. The Board agrees that it has no 
authority to levy a revenue producing tax. However, as 
discussed in the cases previously cited and those discussed in 
the next section of this brief, this court has ruled that 
counties and agencies such as a local board of health may adopt 
regulatory fees to defray the cost of a regulatory program. 
Recognizing that this is a clearly settled question of law, 
petitioners writ on this issue should be denied. 
POINT II. 
THE LICENSING FEE STANDARD IMPOSED BY THE 
BOARD CONSTITUTES A FEE RATHER THAN A TAX. 
Petitioners contend that the law with respect to 
determining whether a regulatory or licensing fee schedule is a 
fee or a tax is also unsettled by this court. Such a claim is 
erroneous in view of the large body of law, including recent 
pronouncements by this court, on this very issue. 
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In Utah Restaurant Association, supra at 1164, this 
court discussed the relevant factors to be considered in 
determining whether a regulatory fee schedule amounts to a 
tax. The two factors mentioned are "whether the measures have 
been designed to defray some or all of the costs of inspecting 
the food establishment on which it is imposed" and whether 
"there is some assurance that the money collected will be used 
to defray those costs." By evaluating a local board's finding 
of fact and conclusions of law in light of these standards, 
this court remarked that a reviewing court should have "little 
difficulty" determining whether a fee schedule constitutes a 
fee or a tax. Id. 
Despite the clear standards articulated in Utah 
Restaurant Association, petitioners seek to create their own 
standard of review. Their standard, which was apparently 
accepted by the trial court, is based on a pure "user fee" 
theory in which all fees are considered taxes unless the 
recipient of government services requests and is specifically 
benefitted by the services. In support of this theory, 
petitioners refer to subdivision "impact fee" cases where this 
court has articulated specific factors to be considered in 
determining the "reasonableness" of the impact fee. (See e.g. , 
Banberrv Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899, 903 
(Ut. 1981). Clearly, the focus of these impact fee cases is 
not on the standard for determining whether the exaction is a 
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fee or a tax but whether the exaction is fair and reasonable, 
which is not a question presented for review in this case. Not 
one of the cases cited by plaintiffs hold that an inspection 
fee, designed to defray some or all of the costs of an 
inspection program, is essentially a tax. 
Unable to locate any supporting Utah cases on this 
issue, petitioners turn to Nat'l Cable Television Assoc, v. 
U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 1146, 415, U.S. 336, 39 L.Ed 2d 370 (1974), 
where the Supreme Court ruled that certain FCC fees are 
allowable only if the fees fairly taken into consideration the 
value of the services to the recipient. (415 U.S. at 337). As 
in the impact fee cases cited by petitioners, the language 
excised from Nat' 1 Cable is out of context and does not apply 
to regulatory fee cases in general. Nat'1 Cable deals with a 
federal statute which specifically requires consideration of 
the value of services provided to cable television operators as 
a prerequisite to the imposition of charges. No similar 
statutory requirement exists for a board's enactment of 
regulatory fees. Rather, the Local Health Department Act, 
section 26-24-14(14), limits the imposition and collection of 
fees to "public health purposes." Obviously, public health 
concerns justify the implementation of a restaurant inspection 
program; otherwise, a health department has no business 
conducting the food inspections. Benefits to private industry 
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are only incidental to the public purposes necessitating the 
regulation. 
Petitioners not only ignore the holding in Utah 
Restaurant Association but the other Utah cases in which this 
court has distinguished fees from taxes. For example, in Best 
Foods, Inc.. v. Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930), this court 
reviewed a Utah statute requiring manufacturers and retailers 
of margarine to pay an inspection fee or an annual license. 
The plaintiff in Best Foods contended that the statute was 
invalid because the fee actually amounted to a tax. This 
court, noting that a license "tax" upon the inhabitants of the 
city enacted for the sole purpose of raising revenue is 
improper, declared that 
it is well settled that a law which was 
enacted to protect a public interest or 
defend against a public wrong is not a tax, 
although it requires the payment of a 
license fee to bear the expense of carrying 
out its provisions. Supra at 1004. 
[emphasis added]. 
Since the purpose of the fee in the Best Foods case 
was to offset the costs of the service rendered, the court 
upheld the imposition of the license fee. Likewise, in Weber 
Basin Homebuilders Assoc, v. Rov City, 487 P.2d 866, (Utah 
1971), this court distinguished license fees from taxes 
according to the purpose of the fee: 
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If the money collected is for a license to 
engage in a business and the proceeds 
therefrom are mainly to service, regulate 
and police such business or activity, it is 
regarded as a license fee. On the other 
hand, if the factors just stated are minimal 
and money collected is mainly for raising 
revenue for general municipal purposes, it 
is properly regarded as the imposition of a 
tax, and this is so regardless of the terms 
used to describe it. 
The many Utah cases referenced by the Board and the 
petitioners all affirm the holding articulated above and 
substantiate the Board's position that this is a clearly 
settled area of law. For these reasons, petitioners' writ on 
this second issue should be denied. 
POINT III. 
THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW NEED NOT BE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED IN A PUBLIC HEARING. 
Petitioners contend that since local boards of health 
are required by statute to file findings of fact and 
conclusions of law when adopting a regulation, boards must also 
conduct a thorough evidentiary hearing to establish a record in 
support of their findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 
effect, petitioners contend that the type of hearing mandated 
by the Act for rule making proceedings is a trial-type hearing. 
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In light of the purpose of the public hearing 
requirement for rule making proceedings, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that the legislature intended a trial-type hearing. 
Obviously, the purpose of such hearings is to give the public 
the opportunity to comment and thereby influence the board of 
health in its decision to adopt, revise, or reject a 
regulation. The public hearing is not designed to give 
residents the opportunity to cross-examine the Board or other 
residents who may wish to speak at the hearing or to be 
confronted with all of the evidence which is to be presented 
to, or considered by, the board. In this respect, the hearing 
is markedly different from an adjudicatory proceeding where, as 
indicated in the cases cited in the petitioners1 brief, parties 
have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and where the only 
evidence or testimony which may be considered is that produced 
at the hearing. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, "notice 
and comment" type hearings are not meaningless. It goes 
without saying that there is value in receiving citizen input 
on government programs that directly impact regulated 
industries and the general public. 
As mentioned, the only basis for concluding that a 
trial-type proceeding is required is the language in the Local 
Health Department Act requiring findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. However, in evaluating the provisions of 
the Act, this court observed that 
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Section 26-24-20 is confusingly written and 
deals with two distinct subjects—rule 
making by a board and enforcement actions by 
a department. Subparts (1) through (3) of 
section 26-24-20 specify the steps that a 
board must go through in promulgating rules. 
and regulations or standards. Utah Rest. 
Ass'n, supra. at 1161 [emphasis added] 
Thus, despite the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law requirement in subsection (3), this court recognizes that 
sections (1) through (3) address a rule making procedure rather 
than a trial-type enforcement action. Such were also the 
findings of the court of appeals on this issue. (Opinion of 
the Court of Appeals, Exhibit A, p. 5). 
Recognizing that the cases and authorities referenced 
in petitioner's brief deal with enforcement or adjudicatory 
actions rather than rule making proceedings, it is unnecessary 
to specifically discuss each case or authority. For example, 
petitioners cite 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law, §444 in 
their brief in support of the position that an administrative 
decision may not be based on the decision maker's "own 
knowledge, secret staff input, or other evidence outside of the 
hearing." (Petitioners' Brief, p. 18). Yet, Section 283 of 
the same administrative law section of Am Jur, which relates to 
rule making procedures, speaks of a very informal hearing 
process designed for consultation and enlightenment rather than 
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closed issue adjudication. Likewise, the other cases and 
authorities cited by petitioners in their brief deal with 
trial-type proceedings and do not stand for the position that 
full-blown evidentiary hearings are required in rule making 
proceedings. 
The issues in this case are essentially the same as 
those presented to this court in the earlier Davis County 
case. In the Davis County case, this court did not require the 
type of evidentiary proceeding suggested by the petitioners. 
Rather, this court required strict compliance with the 
procedures outlined in the Local Health Department Act. Unlike 
the Davis County Board of Health in the earlier case, the Salt 
Lake City-County Board of Health has meticulously complied with 
the intent and the specific provisions of the Local Health 
Department Act. In addition, the Board has complied with the 
court's advice given in the Davis County case relative to the 
preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 
Utah Restaurant Assoc, supra, at 1164. Since the procedural 
requirements of the Act have already been addressed and 
clarified by this court and the Board is in full compliance; 
there is no need for further review by this court. The Board 
respectfully requests that petitioners' writ be denied. 
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IN THE UTAH COUtfT OF APPEALS 
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Utah Restaurant Association, a 
Utah non-profit corporation; Utah 
Retail Grocers Association, a Utah 
npn-profit corporation; Lamb's 
Restaurant; Flying Dees Family 
Restaurants; Kentucky Fried 
Chicken-Harmon*s Management Corp,; 
Gastronomy, Inc.; Taco Maker, Inc.# 
Market Street Grill; Market Street 
Bfoiler; New Yorker Restaurant; 
Hilton Hotels-Pearson Enterprises; 
Sizzling Platter, Inc.; Stan's 
Market; N.P.S.; Crystal Palace 
Market; Wheel-In Market; The Table 
Supply; Voyles Market; The Store; 
Albertson's, Inc.; Family Market; 
Safeway Stores, Inc.; Tanning 
Experience; O.5?. S\«ggs ftl; SXB 
Enterprises; 8th Avenue Meat & 
Grocery; Macey's, Inc.; Bell's 48t^ 
St. Market; Peterson Foodtown; 
pood-4-Less; Dan's Foods; Montie's 
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OPINION 
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Case No. 870420-CA 
F I L E D 
MaryT Noontn 
Cleric of trie Court 
Utaft Court of Appeals 
Tliird District Court, Salt Lake County 
TJie Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: David E. Yocom, Thomas &• Christensen, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Gary E. Atkin, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the -Board-), 
seeks reversal of a declaratory judgment holding its food 
service establishment inspection fee regulation, adopted under 
the Local Health Department Act (the -Act-),1 legally 
invalid. We reverse. 
The Board is a non-elected body appointed by the Salt Lake 
City and County Commissioners to act as a local board of 
health. Its powers and duties are set forth in the Act. See 
Utah Code Ann* § 26-24-14 (1984). At a June 1986 meeting, the 
Board discussed reviving a plan to initiate an inspection fee to 
be paid by "food service/food establishment- businesses. Staff 
members presented information about inspection fee 
classifications and schedules in several nearby states and 
estimated the health department was spending $600,000 to inspect 
food establishments at least twice yearly as required by Utah 
State Food Service Regulations. The Board voted to hold a 
public hearing on the inspection fee proposal. A fee schedule 
(referred to as the -fee standard") was drafted, listing 
categories of food establishments and setting annual inspection 
fees that ranged from $40 to $100, depending on the number of 
service bays, or the number of seats, or square footage. The 
dollar amounts, categories, and definitions in the proposed 
standard were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations of 
the departments staff and the Board's deliberations. 
After publication of notice in local newspapers and a 
thirty-day period for public comment, during which copies of the 
proposed fee schedule and regulation were made available to the 
public, a public hearing was held on September 10, 1986, at 
which approximately 30-40 people submitted oral and written 
comments. There was no testimony or written evidence submitted 
at this public hearing showing the basis for the food 
establishment categories or fee amounts set forth in the 
proposed inspection fee schedule. Health department staff 
prepared a document summarizing and responding to the criticisms 
of the proposed schedule made at the public hearing. The Board 
also prepared a draft of its findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and order, required by Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984) 
as part of the rulemaking process. Sfifi Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. 
Davis County Bd. of Health. 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-24-1 through -24 (1984). 
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At its October 2, 1986, meeting, Board members again 
discussed the fee schedule among themselves and heard 
additional input from representatives of affected food 
establishments. The Board then voted to institute the fee 
program and adopted the prepared findings, conclusions, and 
order, in which it found there was no information put forth by 
critics demonstrating that the proposed fee was either 
unlawful, excessive, not tied directly to the cost of the 
inspection program ($453,000), or not to be used solely to 
support that program. It also specifically found that the 
proposed fees were reasonable and that they would raise 
$156,000, approximately one-third of the annual cost of the 
inspection program. With regard to the use of the new fees, 
the Board stated: 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee 
will be deposited in an account of the 
Health fund set up specifically to receive 
monies generated by the proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food 
Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
The respondents subsequently filed this declaratory 
judgment action2 to challenge the fee regulation's 
constitutionality and validity. After the parties stipulated 
to undisputed facts regarding the sequence of events and the 
basis for the Board's findings and conclusions, three issues 
were submitted for determination on cross-motions for summary 
judgment and ruled on.3 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 through -13 (1987). S&2, Utah 
Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 
1161 (Utah 1985) (rules of county board of health constitute 
"municipal ordinance" whose construction or validity can be 
challenged in a declaratory judgment action). 
3. The respondents also contended the Board had not complied 
with the statutory procedural requirements in imposing the 
fees, presumably for unarticulated reasons other than the lack 
of evidence at the hearing to support the findings and fee 
schedule. However, the trial court did not rule on this as a 
separate issue, and it has not been raised in this appeal. 
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The trial court held the fee regulation invalid and void ab 
initio on each of the asserted grounds: (1) the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law adopted by the Board on October 2, 
1986, are not supported by evidence presented at the public 
hearing held September 10, 1986, contrary to the requirements of 
the Act; (2) despite its label, the inspection -fee" is invalid 
because it constitutes a tax, which the Board is not statutorily 
authorized to levy; and (3) even if it is not a tax, the Act 
does not authorize the Board to impose fees in the form of 
charges on food establishments to defray the costs of the food 
establishment inspection program. 
The Board contends the trial court erred on all three 
points. On appeal, we do not defer to the trial court's rulings 
on these questions of law. Instead, we review them under a 
correction of error standard. E.g., Creer v. Vallev Bank & 
Trust Co. . 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Dec. 9, 1988); Western Kane 
County Spec. Serv. Pistr, Wo, 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 p.2d 
1376 (Utah 1987). 
VALIDITY OF BOARD FINDINGS 
Section 26-24-20(1) of the Act gives the Board authority to 
enact rules, regulations, or standards "necessary for the 
promotion of public health . . . and the prevention of outbreaks 
and spread of communicable and infectious diseases. . . . " 
However/ the Board is required to provide public hearings prior 
to any such enactment. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(2) 
(1984). Subsection (3) states: 
The hearings may be conducted by the board 
at a regular or special meeting, or the 
board may appoint hearing officers, who 
shall have power and authority to conduct 
hearings in the name of the board at a 
designated time and place. A record or 
summary of the proceedings of any hearing 
shall be taken and filed with the board, 
together with findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and the order of the 
board or hearing officer. In any hearing, 
a member of the board or the hearing 
officer shall have power to administer 
oaths, examine witnesses, and issue notice 
of the hearings or subpoenas in the name 
of the board requiring the testimony of 
witnesses and the production of evidence 
relevant to any matter in the hearing. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984). Respondents do not assert 
a complete lack of any basis for the proposed fee schedule. 
Instead, respondents contend this section of the Act requires 
the findings of the Board to be supported by at least some 
evidence introduced at the required public hearing "or the 
mandate for a public hearing is worthless." The parties agree 
that the Board's fee standards were prepared on the basis of 
information provided by health department staff to the Board 
before the public hearing and not on the basis of evidence 
submitted at the public hearing. Therefore, respondents argue, 
the findings and the fee schedule are invalid. 
In effect, respondents contend that the public hearing 
mandated by the Act during rulemaking is a trial-type hearing. 
They claim they were not fully informed of the information 
submitted to and considered by the Board; they complain they 
did not have the opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence or 
cross-examine everyone submitting information to the Board. 
Those are the main elements of a trial. The trial court 
accepted this argument and held that the statute limited the 
rulemaking process to consideration of "evidence" presented at 
the September 10, 1986, public hearing. We conclude this is an 
erroneous interpretation of the statute*s requirements. 
An inspection fee adopted by a local board of health was 
also at issue in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
Board of Health, in which the fee standard was invalidated 
because the board had failed to comply with the statutory 
requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law be 
filed. In thus applying the clear letter of the law, the court 
noted that such a requirement is normally associated only with 
the adjudication of a claim, not with rule promulgation. Id. 
709 P.2d at 1164. 
In interpreting this provision of the Act, the Utah Supreme 
Court clarified that subsections (1) through (3) of section 
26-24-20 delineate the steps which a local board must follow in 
its rulemaking process. X$i. at 1161. In contrast, subsections 
(4) through (6) of the same section apply to enforcement 
actions by a local health department. I&. It is apparent 
that, despite the use of terms normally employed in a trial 
context, subsections (1) through (3) create a "notice and 
comment" public hearing rulemaking process, not a trial-type 
procedure. 
There is no question that notice and opportunity to be 
heard were provided to the public in accordance with the 
statute. It is also apparent respondents had a full and fair 
opportunity to present evidence to the Board supporting their 
claims that the fee is unnecessary and burdensome and that the 
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fee schedule is unreasonable in the way it categorizes food 
establishments. The text of the proposed fee schedule, drafted 
based on information provided to the Board by its staff, was 
made available to the public during the comment period. The 
public hearing was conducted by a health department staff 
member as hearing officer, and three other representatives of 
the department were present. Oral statements and written 
comments were received from various organizations and 
individuals, including many of the respondents and their legal 
counsel. Attendees were informed that a summary of the hearing 
and written comments would be submitted to the Board before its 
regular meeting on October 2, 1986, and that interested parties 
could attend that meeting and make additional comments. The 
Board's staff prepared and submitted written responses to the 
comments made at the September public hearing. Representatives 
of the respondents and their legal counsel appeared at the 
October 2 meeting and made further arguments to the Board prior 
to its final adoption of findings, conclusions of law, and an 
order approving the fee regulation. 
The foregoing process comports with the procedure 
prescribed in the statute. Further, the Board*s procedures 
were in accord with the purpose of a public rulemaking hearing, 
i.e., to afford interested persons an opportunity to submit 
written data, views, and arguments regarding why the proposed 
regulation should or should not be adopted. fias Colorado Auto 
& Truck wreckers Ass'n v, Department of Revenue* 618 p.2d 646, 
652 (Colo. 1980) (in which the statute described the purpose of 
the mandatory public hearing in these terms). 
Hearings in administrative rulemaking 
procedure are usually either investigatory 
or designed to permit persons who may not 
have been reached in a previous process of 
consultation and conference to come 
forward with evidence or opinion. The 
purpose is not to try a case, but to 
enlighten the administrative agency, and 
to protect private interests against 
uninformed and unwise action. 
2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 283 (1962). 
Section 26-24-20(3) cannot properly be said to require an 
adversarial, trial-type hearing when there is no requirement that 
the Boardfs rulemaking be based solely on a trial-type 
870420-CA 6 
record.4 The statute does not say evidence must be produced at 
the hearing and upon such evidence the Board shall make written 
findings. Although the statute authorizes the Board or its 
hearing officer to take testimony and compel witnesses to attend 
or produce relevant "evidence" at the public hearing, it does not 
say the Board shall act only on the basis of such "evidence" or 
the record compiled exclusively at the public hearing. In 
addition# contrary to the trial court's reading of the statute, 
it imposes no affirmative duty on the Board to submit evidence at 
the public hearing in support of its own proposed fee 
regulation, fi££ Long v. Department of Nat, Res., 118 Ohio App. 
369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963). 
In short, although the Board must consider all material 
presented to it during the public comment period and at the 
public hearing that is relevant to a proposed rule or regulation, 
the Act does not restrict it to acting only on such data or 
testimony when finally adopting rules or regulations. Sfifi SJLSL&S. 
v. Hebert. 743 P.2d 392, 397 (Alaska App. 1987); International 
Council of Shopping Centers v. Oregon Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 27 
Or. App. 321, 556 P.2d 138 (1976). It may rely on its own 
experience, its expertise, and any facts known to it from 
whatever source they are drawn. £ss 1 K. Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 6.17 (2d ed. 1978); SJSS. also International Council 
of Shopping Centers. 566 P.2d at 141 (agency involved in informal 
4. 
Trial procedure is inappropriate on 
nonfactual issues, on issues of law or 
policy, and on issues of broad legislative 
fact. Trial procedure is especially 
inappropriate for untangling jumbles of 
policy, law, discretion, and legislative 
fact. The reason for not using trial 
procedure is that such procedure is not 
intrinsically designed for nonfactual 
issues; much administrative experience 
proves that trial procedure to resolve 
issues other than issues of adjudicative 
fact or specific legislative fact is 
wasteful, cumbersome, expensive, and 
unhelpful. No trial judge would use trial 
procedure to resolve a nonfactual issue. 
Neither should an agency. 
3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.3 (2d ed. 1980). 
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rulemaking can properly rely on data gathered from publications 
in its field, interviews, input from advisory committees, or even 
information informally obtained). It follows that adverse public 
input, once considered by the Board, may be disregarded even if 
unrebutted by testimony or evidence presented at the public 
hearing. StSSi Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n. 618 P.2d at 
652. 
The trial court erred in holding the Board's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law invalid under the Act. 
AUTHORIZATION TO IMPOSE FEES 
A local board of health has no inherent power to charge fees 
or levy taxes of any kind. Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County 
Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d at 1163-64. "Any such authority must be 
conferred on it by the county which created it, acting within its 
lawful authority, or by the legislature." X&. at 1164. In this 
case, the Board contends it is authorized to impose an inspection 
fee under its statutory grant of powers. In ruling that the 
inspection fee constituted either an impermissible tax or an 
unauthorized fee, the trial court focused only on section 
26-24-14(14) of the Act, which gives a local health department 
authority to 
establish and collect appropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, 
state, or private donations or grants of 
funds, property, services, or materials 
for public health purposes, and to make 
such agreements, not inconsistent with 
law, as may be required as a condition to 
receiving such donation or grant[.] 
The trial court concluded this provision does not authorize 
the Board to offset a portion of the costs involved in 
particular programs through the imposition of fees for that 
program. According to the trial court, the term -fees" in this 
section refers only to charges for "such minor items as 
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees for 
specific services to particular persons for their specific 
benefit . . . ." We do not agree. 
The term "fees" is used three times in the Local Health 
Department Act. In addition to section 26-24-14(14), section 
26-24-15(1) provides for apportionment of the local health 
department costs among participating counties and 
municipalities and states that "money available from fees, 
contracts, surpluses> grants, and donations may be used to 
establish and maintain local health departments•" Moneys 
received from these sources, including "fees . . . for local 
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health purposes, "are credited to a health department fund 
which must be expended only for maintenance and operation of 
the local health department. Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-18 (1984). 
In all three sections of the Act, fees are grouped with 
several other means of providing funds for establishing, 
maintaining, and operating a local health department, including 
its various programs designed to promote and protect public 
health. There is not the slightest hint that the legislature 
intended to restrictively define "fees" as involving only 
minimal charges for clerical or ministerial services.5 We 
therefore conclude that a charge imposed by a local board on 
health department program participants to defray the costs of 
the program is a "fee" within the purview of the Act. 
FEE OR TAX? 
Whether or not the particular food establishment inspection 
fee regulation adopted by the Board is a "tax," not authorized 
by the Act, turns on the actual purpose for its adoption. See 
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164. 
If the money collected is for a license to 
engage in a business and the proceeds 
therefrom are purposed mainly to service, 
regulate and police such business or 
activity, it is regarded as a license 
fee. On the other hand, if the factors 
just stated are minimal, and the money 
collected is mainly for raising revenue 
for general municipal purposes, it is 
properly regarded as the imposition of a 
tax, and this is so regardless of the 
terms used to describe it. 
Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Rov Citv, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 
P.2d 866, 867 (1971) (footnote omitted). See Provo Citv v. Provo 
Meat & Packing Co.. 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 479 (1917) 
(municipality may charge meat sellers fees to cover costs of 
inspection and policing of meat sales). 
5. The record before the Board shows that other fees are 
regularly charged by the health department to offset the costs 
of mandatory immunizations, as well as for inspections under 
the asbestos and solid waste programs. 
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In Utah Restaurant Association, which involved a similar 
inspection fee regulation adopted by a local board of health, 
the food establishments also claimed the fee was invalid as a 
tax. The Utah Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue, 
however, because the regulation was invalidated on the 
alternative basis, noted above, i.e., the boardfs failure to 
file the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164. Nonetheless, the 
court proceeded to issue an advisory opinion describing factual 
findings by the board that would provide information supporting 
a conclusion that its charge for inspecting food establishments 
was a valid fee instead of a tax. See id. First, has the 
regulation been designed to actually defray some or all of the 
costs of inspecting the food service establishments on which it 
is imposed? Second, is there some assurance that the money 
collected will actually be used to defray those costs? With 
adequate answers to these questions, a reviewing court can more 
easily determine the true nature of the enactment, S££ id*# and 
make the distinction drawn in Weber Basin Home Builders 
Association, siuara. 
Here, the record demonstrates the Board acted to comply 
with the advice in Utah Restaurant Association when it adopted 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Board 
specifically found the actual cost of the food establishment 
inspection program to be $453,000, of which only $156,000 would 
be paid for by the proposed fees. The balance was to be raised 
through food handler permits and general taxes. The Board's 
findings, conclusions, and order require the collected 
inspection fees to be deposited in a special account, to be 
drawn upon to support the food establishment inspection 
program. Furthermore, the record before the Board clearly 
shows that the inspection fees were earmarked for the 
inspection program and could be spent for no other purpose, a 
fact reiterated before the district court in the unrefuted 
affidavit of a deputy county auditor. Respondents did not 
submit any controverting evidence or information on these 
matters to the Board or to the trial court. 
In light of the purpose of the inspection fee program, its 
partial funding by fees imposed on the inspected food 
establishments, and the restricted use of the collected fees, 
we conclude the inspection fee regulation adopted by the Board 
was not invalid as an unauthorized tax. The trial court1s 
ruling to the contrary was in error. 
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed, 
Norman H. Jacks^6, Judge 
^/ut^u!^^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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Gary E. A t k i n , Esq . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
e t a l . , FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
C i v i l No. C86-9U24 
v . (JUDGE MOFFAT) 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY 
BOARD OF HEALTH, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding; and plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Gary E. Atkm, Esq-, and defendant being represented bj 
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the parties having submitted the matter to th< 
Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination 
both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points am 
Authorities and Reply Memoranda in support of their respectiv 
positions; and the matter having been fully argued to the Court 
and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda, as well as th 
pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues, ana othe 
' i ' i?87 
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documents filed of record; and the Court now being fully mrormed 
in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff associations, the Utah Restaurant Association, 
Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah Hotel-Motel 
Association, are non-profit corporations, duly organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with their 
principal places of business in Salt Lake County, and whose 
memberships are composed of persons, corporations, partnerships, 
and other entities engaged in, associated with, or having a 
direct interest in the restaurant and food service industry in 
the state of Utah, whose memberships includes numerous persons 
whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, and which 
are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards" (the "fee standard") involved in this action. 
Each of those associations is a person within the meaning of 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah 
Code Anno. (1953), as amended, and Utah's Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq,, Utah Code Anno. 
(1953), as amended. Each plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
sought under those Acts. 
2. The remaining plaintiffs are also persons subject to, 
and whose legal relations are affected by, the fee standard and 
are persons within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended, as 
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well as within the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Sectior 
63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended. 
3. The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the "Board") 
is a non-elected body, appointed by the Salt Lake City and County 
Commissioners to act as a local board of health pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
as amended, which provisions specify the statutory powers anc 
duties of the Board. 
4. The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit anc 
is subject to the jurisdiction and process of this Court, 
pursuant to Sections 63-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), at 
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), a: 
amended. 
5. This is an action brought by plaintiffs pursuant to th< 
provisions of the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah Rules o 
Civil Procedure, for a declaratory judgment to determine th< 
validity and constitutionality of the "Food Service/Fooc 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by the Board. 
6. The exhibits attached to the Stipulation of the parties 
as subsequently supplemented by the parties, reflect all meeting* 
of the Board relative to the fee standard and the times, place* 
and purposes ot those meetings, as well as all actions taken 
comments made, and other input presented at those meetings, anc 
all notices thereof, which were considered in the formulation o 
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative tc 
the adoption of the fee standard. 
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7. Except as referred to in Paragraph 6, there are no other 
items of testimony, documents, papers, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, or Orders of the Board regarding the proposal 
and adoption of the fee standard. 
8. The inspections contemplated in the fee standard 
constitute no change from the inspections previously conducted, 
except that previous inspections were paid with Health Department 
funds. 
9. Fees collected by defendant pursuant to the fee standard 
have not been expended but have been deposited into a Health 
Department fund and are reflected, for bookkeeping purposes, as a 
credit to a separate discretionary Health Department account, 
which does not reflect deposits from any other source. Defendant 
intended that this account would be used to pay for a portion of 
the food inspection program or, if the court should so direct, to 
provide a refund to the persons making the payments. 
10. The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied 
in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations of the 
Health Department staff. The Board made its determination, based 
upon the recommendations of staff and its own deliberations, that 
the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable* 
There was no public input regarding those dollar amounts, 
categories and definitions. 
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11. There are no existing genuine issues as to any material 
fact relevant to this action which would require an evidentiary 
hearing. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does 
hereby make and order the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant does not have the authority to impose charges 
as specified in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensmc 
Fee Standards" for food service establishments pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (195 3), 
or otherwise. Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Anno. (1953 
refers only to the charging of fees for such minor items a: 
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees fo 
specific services to particular persons for their specific 
benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by governmenta 
bodies. The statute does not authorize defendant to attempt t< 
offset substantial portions of its total costs, includm-
salaries and overhead involved in particular programs, throug 
the imposition of such charges. Therefore, since defendant wa 
acting in excess of its statutory authority in attempting t 
impose those charges, they should be declared to be invalid, an 
null and void ab initio. 
2. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopte 
by defendant are unsupported by the evidence presented at th 
public hearing of September 10, 1986, relative to the adoption c 
its "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" ic 
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food service establishments. While the Court recognizes that 
defendant is not bound by the evidence presented at such public 
hearings, the Findings of Fact mandated by Section 26-24-1, et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), should have some support in the 
evidence so presented. Therefore, the standard imposing the 
charges should be declared invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
3. The provisions of the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards" amount to a tax. The Board is not 
authorized to levy taxes and# therefore, the standard should be 
declared to be invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
4. Any charges previously collected by defendant based upon 
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
were improperly assessed and should be returned to plaintiffs and 
others paying the same. 
5. Defendant should be restrained from assessing further 
charges pursuant to the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards^*-^ 
Dated this /f day of (L t y ^ C U ^ y ^ * 1987. 
/^ jJcijpftrd JR. «6'f ia t 
District C Q 6 D ^ Judge 
ATTPST 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
C o u n s e l f o r D e f e n d a n t 
H. J. . 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the office 
of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, County Complex, 
2100 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, this 3rd 
day of August, 1987. 
7 
W^€ 
EXHIBIT 
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
This Standard is adopted this day 
of , 1986, by the Salt Lake City-County 
Board of Health, a local board of health organized pursuant 
to Section 26-24-9, U.C.A. (1953). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, it has became necessary to establish a 
fee schedule for food/food service establishments in Salt Lake 
County to pay a portion of Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment1 s reasonable expenses of inspecting and enforcing 
State and local food rules and regulations : and 
WHEBEAS, the Salt Lake City-County Health Department 
is authorized to adopt this standard pursuant to Section 
26-24-14 (14) U.C.A. (1953), and Salt Lake City-County Health 
Departjnent Regulation No. 4 and No. 5, and No. 6, Food 
Service Establishments and Food Establishments, Sections 4.2. 
NCW, THEREFORE, The Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health ordains as follows : 
Section I. Definitions; 
Food Service Establishments - Restaurants, restaurants/clubs, 
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias, 
snack bars/fountains, nursing 
hones, day care centers, bars, 
lounges, ice cream stores, 
or 
Food Establishments -
any place where focd is prepared and 
intended for individual portion 
servicef whether the consumption is 
on or off the premises or there is 
a charge for the food. This does not 
include private homes where food is 
prepared or served for individual 
family consumption. 
Grocery stores, bakeries, candy 
factories, bottling plants, convenience 
stores
 f canning factories, meat 
processing plants
 f cold storage ware-
houses , food storage warehouses, or 
similar establishments where food pro-
ducts are manufactured, canned, packed, 
processed, storedf transported, prepared, 
sold, or offered for sale. 
Tenporary Food Service 
Establishments -
Service Bays -
Seats -
Food Service establishments that oper-
ate at a fixed location for not more than 
14 consecutive days in conjunction with 
a single event or celebration. 
Include, but are not limited to, cash 
register stands, drive-up windows, walk-
up windows, and/or different points frcm 
which food is dispensed or served to the 
public. Waited tables are not considered 
service bays. 
Seating that is available for the 
public within a food service establishment. 
The number of seats shall be determined 
by the listing on the business license 
application or by physical count by the 
regulatory authority. 
Banquet seating, not used for everyday 
seating, shall not be included in the 
total number of seats. The number of 
beds, in lieu of the number of seats, 
may be used to classify hospitals and 
correctional institutions. 
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Square Footage - Square footage will be determined 
on the basis of the outside wall 
measurements of the food establishment. 
Section II. Annual Fees. All food service/food establishments 
in Salt Lake County shall be classified according to the following 
criteria into one of six (6) categories for the purpose of 
assessing annual fees: 
Category I $40.00 Day Care centers, nursing homes and food 
service/food establishments providing 
either one service bay or zero to ten 
seats. 
Category II 
Category III 
Category IV 
$60.00 
$80.00 
$100.00 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either t w service bays or 
eleven to fifty seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either three service bays 
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats. 
Food service/focd establishments pro-
viding either four or more 
service bays or seventy-six or 
more seats. 
Category V (a) $40.00 
(b) $60.00 
(c) $80.00 
(d) $100.00 
Food establishments with under 
2f000 square feet. 
2f000 to 3,000 square feet. 
3,000 to 5,000 square feet. 
5f000 square feet or more. 
Category VI $10.00 flat 
+ $5.00 per 
day (not to 
exceed $35 total) 
Temporary food service establish-
ments operating fourteen days or 
less. 
Section III. General Provisions: 
1. All fees shall be paid annually and are due 
in advance on the 1st day of January of each year. 
>3-
s—_-_—_f .._-_..—., v-—.». rr»iw* «, *-rvA-ajuiAC3d xxuense ^pp i ,i c^rmon is rraae 
after the 1st day of July, except under Category VI, the fee for 
the first year shall be at the rate of 50 per cent (50%) of the 
annual fee* No fees, or any part thereof, may be refunded or 
transferred. 
2. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall 
attempt to notify each food establishment/food service estab-
lishment prior to the date an which fees are due of its deter-
mination of category assignment, and the amount of fees 
due. Fees unpaid after forty-five (45) days of the due date 
will be assessed a penalty of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
amount of such fees which shall be added to the original amount. 
Failure to pay annual fees and additional charges after ninety 
(90) days of the due date may result in revocation or suspension 
of food/food service permits and the right to operate. A twenty-
five per cent (25%) charge will be assessed for each returned check. 
3. Consistent with Health Department Regulations No. 4, 
Section 4.2, and No. 5, Section 4.2, and No. 6, Section 4.2, the 
Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall provide notice and 
opportunity for a hearing to consider or reconsider the revocation 
or suspension of the right to operate due to nonpayment of fees. 
4. In determining food establishment/food service 
establishment categories, the Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment may classify hospitals, correctional facilities, and other 
institutions by seats, beds, or other reasonable criteria. 
Day care centers and nursing hones will be classified as Category 
I. Food establishments that have multiple units under one roof 
will be classified by square footage. 
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^. jj. any provision, clause
 f sentence, or paragraph 
of this standard or the application thereof shall be held to 
be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the other provisions 
or applications of this standard. The valid part of any 
clause, sentence, or paragraph of this standard shall be given 
independence from the invalid provisions or application and to 
this end the provisions of this standard is declared to be 
severable. 
Section IV. This Standard shall beccroe effective 
fifteen (15) days after its passage. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED on the day and year first above 
written. 
SALT LAKE CITy-COUNTY BOAFD OF HEALTH 
By: 
Chairman 
Voting 
Voting 
Voting 
(0887J) 
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(R-73-74) 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department carries out responsibilities 
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department 
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24. 
2. Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to 
carry out its responsibility. 
3. On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive 
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was 
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret 
News at'least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 
4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to 
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on 
October 2, 1986. 
5. While objection was raised by several individuals-as to the charging 
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that 
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was 
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program 
and to be used to support this cost. 
6. The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is 
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor 
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee 
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees. 
7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County 
Health Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler permits total 
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees 
totals $430,000. 
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, v/hich is 
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program. 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of 
the Health fund set up specifically to receive monies generated by the 
proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
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The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that 
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees 
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in 
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees 
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are 
legal and meet the intent of Section 26-24-14, Therefore, the Board adopts 
the fees standard as attached this 2nd day of October , 1986-
son, M.D., Chairman 
City-County Board of Health 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
26-1-6, Fee schedule adopted by department. 
The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may 
be assessed for services rendered by the department, provided 
that such fees shall be reasonable and fair and shall be 
submitted to and approved by the legislature as part of the 
department's annual appropriations request. Such fees shall be 
paid into the state treasury in accordance with Section 63-38-9. 
* * * 
26-24-4, County health departments. 
The governing body of each county shall create and 
maintain a local health department. 
* * * 
26-24-14, Utah Code Ann. Powers and duties of departments. 
(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, state, or private 
donations or grants of funds, property, services, or materials 
for public health purposes, and to make such agreements, not 
inconsistent with law, as may be required as a condition to 
receiving such donation or grant; 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS (con't) 
26-24-15, Utah Code Ann. Apportionment of department costs — 
Contracts with state department to provide 
services—Requirement for percentage match of state 
funds by local health departments. 
(1) The cost of establishing and maintaining a local 
health department may be apportioned among the participating 
municipalities and counties on the basis of population in 
proportion to the total population of all municipalities and 
counties within the jurisdiction of the local health 
department, or upon such other bases as is agreeable to the 
participating counties and municipalities. For purposes of 
this subsection, "population" means population estimates 
prepared by the state planning coordinator. In addition, money 
available from fees, contracts, surpluses, grants, and 
donations may be used to establish and maintain local health 
departments. 
* * * 
26-24-18, Utah Code Ann. Health department fund-- Sources— 
Uses. 
The treasurer of a health department shall, on 
organization of the department, create a health department fund 
to which shall be credited any moneys appropriated or otherwise 
made available by participating counties, cities, or other 
local political subdivisions and any moneys received from the 
state, federal government, or from surpluses, grants, fees or 
donations for local health purposes. Any moneys credited to 
this fund shall be expended only for maintenance and operation 
of the local health department claims or demands against the 
fund shall be allowed on certification by the health officer or 
other employee of the local health department designed by the 
board. 
* * * 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS (con't) 
26-24-20, Utah Code Ann. Regulations adopted by local board 
—Procedure—Administrative and judicial review of 
actions. 
(1) The board may adopt rules, regulations, and 
standards, not in conflict with rules of the department, 
necessary for the promotion of public health, environmental 
health qualify, injury control and the prevention of outbreaks 
and spread of communicable and infectious diseases, that shall 
have the affect of law. Such rules, regulations and standards 
when adopted shall supersede existing local rules, regulations, 
standards and ordinances pertaining to similar subject matter. 
(2) The board shall provide public hearings prior to 
the adoption of any rule, regulation or standard. Notice of 
any such public hearing shall be published at least twice in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the area within the 
jurisdiction of the local health department. 
(3) The hearings may be conducted by the board at a 
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint hearing 
officers, who shall have power and authority to conduct 
hearings in the name of the board at a designated time and 
place. A record or summary of the proceedings of any hearing 
shall be taken and filed with the board, together with findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and the order of the board or 
hearing officer. In any hearing, a member of the board or 
hearing officer shall have the power to administer oaths, 
examine witnesses, and issue notice of the hearings or 
subpoenas in the name of the board requiring the testimony of 
witnesses and the production of evidence relevant to any matter 
in the hearing. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
gfa. 
I hereby certify that on the > day of May, 1989, 
ten (10) true and correct copies of the foregoing were filed 
with the Supreme Court Clerk, and two (2) copies were mailed to: 
Gary E. Atkin 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
311 South State Street 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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